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are in the throes of far-reaching changes whose consequences are 
not yet fully understood. There can be little doubt that feminist 
passions-unintentionally perhaps, but nonetheless substantially-
have endangered freedom. Toward the end of his book, Levin sum-
marizes it well: "A major obstacle to appreciating the extent to 
which liberty has been curtailed in the name of sexual equality is the 
search for a key event, a turning point. Pessimists from Plato to 
Orwell have thought too much in terms of collapse, too little in 
terms of erosion. Contrary to Orwell, the best picture of the future 
may not be a boot stamping on a human face, but a bureaucratic 
black hole drawing one matter after another out of the sphere of 
individual discretion and into itself." 
THE HUMANE IMAGINATION. By Charles Black.t 
Woodbridge, Ct.: Ox Bow Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 201. $16.95. 
Mark Tushnet 2 
Professor Charles Black is one of the masters of constitutional 
law scholarship of his generation. Along with Alexander Bickel 
and Herbert Wechsler, Black decisively shaped our understanding 
of the Constitution. His contributions have been twofold, and both 
are reflected in this collection of his occasional essays. First, he 
insisted on the importance of the overall structure of the Constitu-
tion as a guarantor of liberty. Black developed this point with ref-
erence to federalism, but his general approach can inform 
consideration of separation of powers issues as well. Issues of struc-
ture have become increasingly prominent, as the Reagan adminis-
tration has insisted on interpretations of separation of powers which 
raise important questions about the relation between structures and 
liberty, and as the Supreme Court has become less receptive to ar-
guments asking it to protect liberty directly and nationwide. But 
Black's approach has also occasionally seemed too diffuse to help 
resolve concrete controversies. Despite the careful technical analy-
ses that Black offered, it sometimes seemed that inferences from 
structure could run pretty much wherever the analyst wanted them 
to run. 
Black's second contribution served to control the inferential 
I. Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Law, Georgetown University law Center. 
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process. Simply put, he displayed the most humane sensibility 
available in constitutional law. His articles were always deeply per-
sonal, and showed how sensitivity to the human impact of legal and 
constitutional rules could give answers to the questions he posed. 
After reading The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions 3 one can-
not take seriously all the quibbles scholars have raised about Brown 
v. Board of Education. Nor, having read that article and having 
remembered the background of scholarly criticism of Brown against 
which it was written, can one comfortably dismiss the appeal to 
humanity as "all right for those issues, which are basically easy 
ones, but not much help for the much harder ones we face today." 
Black showed us that though many people regarded Brown as a 
hard decision for its time, it did not have to be seen in that way. 
This should lead us to wonder whether our present quandaries will 
one day appear less difficult than they do today. 
One way to assess these essays is to consider how much they 
are concerned with constitutional law outside the courts. Frederick 
Schauer has revived interest in the issues that go unlitigated because 
their resolution is so obvious that disputes never arise about them.4 
Black has been concerned with another type of issue, although as 
we will see the two types are rather closely related. Black's interest 
lies in analyzing real disputes over the meaning of the Constitution 
that happen not to be important in litigation, sometimes because 
justiciability doctrines make adjudication unavailable but even more 
because the disputes arise in front of those other decisionmakers 
who take oaths to uphold the Constitution-legislators. His con-
cern for the constitutive rules and structures of our government oc-
casionally has the ring of political science about it. For example, 
much of his discussion of the merits of proposals to amend the Con-
stitution to allow national lawmaking by initiative is not distinc-
tively legal. Strikingly, however, he begins with a fundamental 
technical point, that the proposal may violate the constitutional 
prohibition against altering the equality of the states in the Senate.5 
The difficulty with Black's approach is that the technicalities, 
which make his approach a lawyer's rather than a political scien-
tist's, rarely do more than suggest answers. Black mentions that he 
introduced his students to the issue of the scope of Congress's pow-
ers not through the commerce clause but through the admiralty, 
3. 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
4. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
5. We might wonder then about the technical status of an unamendable provision of 
the Constitution. Suppose that appropriate majorities did amend the Constitution to deprive 
the states of equal representation. Is the new amendment unconstitutional? Anti-constitu-
tional? Constitutional, but lawless? Constitutional pure and simple? 
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patents, and post roads clauses, with the effect of suggesting to them 
that expansive interpretations of the power-granting clauses are 
completely uncontroversial over wide ranges of the law and that 
they should therefore not be surprised to find similarly expansive 
interpretations of the commerce clause. My personal favorite is 
that portion of article II, section 2 stating that the president "may 
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of 
the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties 
of their respective Offices." On the face of it, the fact that the Con-
stitution had to state expressly that the president could require 
opinions in writing from cabinet officers suggests that "the execu-
tive Power" vested by article II, section 1, cannot be as all-encom-
passing as is sometimes thought. But here, as elsewhere, competing 
inferences can be drawn from structural provisions: for example, 
perhaps the framers were particularly concerned to avoid problems 
that might arise if cabinet officers could develop independent power 
bases. 
How, then, can Black's approach be useful? The answer, as the 
title of this collection suggests, is to deploy a "humane imagina-
tion." According to Black, the difficulties will disappear if we force 
ourselves to expand our imaginative ability to assimilate the condi-
tions of other peoples' lives. Throughout the essays he stresses the 
importance of what Edmond Cahn called the sense of injustice and 
the role of intuition in guiding judgment. 
This, however, only defers the problem. For, as should be evi-
dent to anyone who reads these essays after reading a selection-
any selection-of Supreme Court decisions, few people are as hu-
mane as Charles Black. Indeed, we might consider the lesson of 
recent nominations to the Supreme Court to be that the process of 
selection for the Court comes close to guaranteeing that only people 
of moderate sensibilities-not too insensitive, but not overly sensi-
tive either (that's what the mainstream is)-will be selected for the 
Court. Given the actual sensibilities of the Justices, the prospects 
that they will deploy Black's humane imagination are not terribly 
encouraging. 6 
Of course, Black is speaking to us, not directly to the Justices. 
Perhaps we should understand his works as examples of edifying 
discourse, exhibiting a humane sensibility in the course of recom-
mending it. By referring to edification, I mean to call up images 
6. I think here of the desperate apotheosizing of Justice O'Connor as an exemplary 
female judge. Sherry, Civic Vinue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 
VA. L. REv. 543,592-613 (1986), and Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 
(1987) (the latter is somewhat more muted than the former). 
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related to those suggested by the term "sensibility" as well. It 
seems to me that Black has a basically classical sense of the range of 
human possibility, rather than a modernist one. For example, in 
one of these essays Louis Armstrong appears as an artist-hero 
whose struggle against the constraints of society provides an exam-
ple for us to admire. But, as Black suggests, the struggle against 
constraints occurs within a framework set by society. He speaks of 
his attraction to jazz, apparently a modernist art form, in terms of 
its allegiance to tradition. 1 
In another forum I would raise questions about the ability of 
classical sensibility to edify under modem circumstances, and about 
the adequacy of that sensibility as an account, even a partial one, of 
human possibility. For the present, though, a different point seems 
more pertinent. Edifying discourse, and its commendation, have 
been around for a long time. One might have expected the need for 
such commendation to have diminished. Yet it obviously has not. 
That in tum suggests that the attempt to solve problems of the un-
just deployment of power by means of edification and humane im-
agination cannot succeed. 
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST 
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE. By Derrick Bell.t New York, 
N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc. 1987. Pp. xii, 288. $19.95. 
COMPASSION VERSUS GUILT AND OTHER ESSAYS. 
By Thomas Sowell.z New York, N.Y.: William Morrow & 
Co. 1987. Pp. 246. $15.95. 
Lino A. Graglia 3 
It is fortunate that I had to read these two books together. The 
great, not to say excessive, pleasure I derive from reading my 
soulmate, Thomas Sowell-for example, "The streets of New Delhi 
are far better paved than the streets of New York. . . . Some Third 
7. I confess that I do not know what exactly to make of the abstract painting by Black, 
entitled "A Quarter-Inch Plate Glass Window in a Color Storm," that he uses for the cover 
of the book. 
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